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THE UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE
KNOXVILLE
O.....CE 0 .. THE SECRETARY

April 26, 1951

ilr. C. Eo Brehm
President
lIne University of Tennessee
Dear President Brehm:
For your information, I am glvlng you a copy of Judge
Robert L. Taylor's opinion in the case of Gene Intchell
Gray et al vs. TIle University of Tennessee et ale This
is the so-called "Negro Casell.
At the moment, it appears that the special committee
appointed by the Board at its meeting of December 4, 1950
to employ counsel, etc. should meet with the attorneys and
determine what further steps should be taken.
Very truly yours,

JPH:ebs
Enclosure

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EA.STERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NORTHERN DIVISION
Filed
April 20, 1951
GENE MITCHELL GHAY ET AL

CIVIL NO. 1567

vs~

lITJIVERSITY OF TEID1ESSEE ET AL

This case was heard by a three-judge court on the record,
briefs and argument of counsel for the respective parties on
plaintiffs I motion for

s~~ary

judgment in their favor under

Rule 56 of the Federal Hules of Civil Procedure.
In an opinion by Circuit Judge Miller, in which Chief
District Judge Darr and District Judge

T~lor

of the Eastern

District of Tennessee, concurred, the Court held that the issue
. involved

j.B

alleged unjust discrimination against the plaintiffs

under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States and not the consti
tutionality of the Tennessee statutes and constitutional provisions
referred to in the complaint.

Following this opinion and the

order entered pursuant thereto, Judge Miller and Judee Darr
withdrew from the case, which is now before this Court for
decision on the motion o
Plaintiffs Gray and Alexander have applied for admission
to the Graduate School and plaintiffs Blakeney and Patterson
have applied for admission to the College of Law, of the
University of Tennessee.

All admittedly are qualified for

admission, except for the fact that they are

negroes~

'The matter of their applications was referred by Universi ty
authori ties to the Board of Trustees, who disposed of the
matter by the following resol"J.tion:
I'\\l'hereas, the Constitution and the statutes
of the State of Tennessee expressly provide that
there shall be segregation in the education of
the races in schools and colleges in thG State
and that a violatJion of the laws of the Stat.e in
this regard subjects the violator to prosecution,
conviction, and punishment ae therein provided; and,
"Whereas, this Board is bound by the Consti tu
tiona.l provision a'1d act.s referred to;
IIBe it therefore resolved, that the applications
by members of the Negro race for admission as
students into The University of Tennessee be and the
same are hereby denied o lf
Following the indicated action by the Board of Trustees,
plaintiffs filed their joint complaint for themselves and on
behalf of all negro citizens similarly situated, praying for
a temporary and, after hearing, a perma,ent order restraining
the defendants from executing the exclusion order of the Board
of Trustees aeainst the plaintiffs, or other negroes similarly
situated, and from all action pursuant to the constitution and
statutes of the Stat.e of Tennessee, and the custom or usage
of the defendants, respecting the requirement of segregation
of whites and negroes in

state·~supported

educational

institutions and exclusion of negroes from the Universit,y of
Tennessee, their references being to Article 11, sec. 12, of
the state constitution, to sections 2403.1, 240) .3, 11395,

11396,

~,d

11397 of the Tennessee Code, and the custom and

usage of defendants of excluding negroes from all colleges,
schools, departments, and divisions of the University of
Tennessee, including the Graduate School and the College of Law.
Defenses interposed are nine in number, but in substance
they are these:

That defendants, in rejecting the applications

of the plaintiffs, were and are

obeJ~ngthe

mandates of the

segregation provisions of the constitution and laws of the
State of Tennessee; that those provisions are in exercise of
the police powers reserved to the states and are valid, the
Fourteenth Amendment and laws enacted thereunder to the
contrary notwithstanding, and that these plaintiffs have no
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standing to bring this action for the reason that they have
not exhaunted their administr3. ti vo remedies under tho e'luivalent
faciliti.es act of 191+1, Code section 2403.3.

The plaintiffs,

nfter alleging in their complaint that the University of
Tennessee maintains a Graduate School and a College of Law
which offer to whi te students the cou.rses sought by plaintiffs,
make the follotdng specific allegation, which defendants, for
failure to deny, adrni t:

liThers is no other in9ti tution

maintained or operated by the State of Tennessee at uhich
plaintiffs might obtain the graduate anQ/or legal education
for which they respectively have applied to The University of
Tennessee o tl
It is, of course, recognized that the Constitution of
the United States is one of enumerated and delegated powers.
To remove original doubt as to the character of federal powers,
the states adopted the Tenth Amendment, which provides:

tiThe

powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States;. are rf;served to the States
respecti-:ely" or to the peopleo"

The Con3titution contains

no specific delegation of police powers, and those powers
are accordingly reserv-edo

But a glance discloses that, in

re1ation to the Tenth Amendment, the Constitution contains
two groups of powers, namely, the previously-delegated powers
and the subsequently··delegated powers

0

By ac.option of the

Fourteenth Amendment, folloYing adoption of the Tenth

&~endment,

the states consented to limitations upon their reserved powers,
particularly in the following respects:
•

•

0

lio State shall make or enforce

abridge the privileges or

i~~unities

a1

y law which shall

of citizens of the United

States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, .without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection 'of the laws.

. . ."

It is recognized that "the police power of a state
extends beyond health, morals and safety, and comprehends the
duty, within constitutional limitations) to protect. the well-being
and tranquility of a community. If

Kovacs v .. Cooper" 336 U.

-3

s.

77 ~ 83(1

(Italics s11pplied).

States "have power to legislate

against what are found to be injurious practices in their internal
corrunercial and business affairs, so long as their laws do not

-

~

!3~

afoul of

~

specifi£

valid federal

525, 536!:'

l~ .. :!

-- -- --

---

~titutional p~ohibition,

£! of

'liJhi taker v" North Carolina J 335 U.S.

(Italics supplied)..

the italicized portions

--~

poir~t

In the foregoing quotations,
up the limitation upon the

exercise of a state's police powers.
Segregation by law may, in a given situation, be a valid
exercise of the state1s police powerso

Gong Lum et al v. Rice et al, 275

with respect to schools.

u.s.

It has been so recognized

78. Also, as to segregation on intrastate trains.

Ferguson, 163

U.s~

5370

Plessy v.

But where enforcement by the state of

a law ran afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment by denying members
of a particular race or

nat~onality

equal rights as to property

or the equal protection of the laws, the state action has been
condemned.

This was the result where state law discriminated

against aliens as to the privilege of employment.
Raich, 239 U.S .. 33"

Truax v.

The same result was reached as to

enforcement of restrictive covenants in deeds, Shelley et ux:
v. Kraemer et ux, 334
Richmond v.

Deans~

U~S.

1; in the housing segregation cases,

4 Circ. 37

F.2d 712, affirmed 281 U.S. 704;

Buchanan v. \larley, 245 U So 60: and in thE' cases where
(I

segregation has resulted in inequality of educational
opportunities for negroes, Sweatt v. Painter et aI, 339 u.S.

629; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S" 637.

From

these cases it appears to be well settled that exercise of the
state's police powers ceases to be valid when it violates
the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The defense

on this ground, therefore, falls.
The second question is whether the plaintiffs have
present standing to bring this action.

To understand the

defense interposed here, it is desirable to look at the
historical background of the act of 1941, of which the Court
takes judicial notice o

;..;

,

On October 18, 1939, six negroes applied for admission
to the University of Tennessee, four to the Graduate Department
and

tl.fO

to the College of Law.

Being denied admission, they

filed their separate petitions for mandamus in the Chancery
Court of Knox County, Tennessee, to require their admissionc
Following denial of the petitions in a consolidated proceeding,
an appeal

V'las

taken to the .supreme Court of Tennessee ,~"lhere

the action of the Chancellor was affirmed by opinion filed
November 7, 1942.
179 Tenno 250.

State ex reI. Michael et al v. Witham et aI,

The Case was not disposed of by the Chancellor

on its merits, but on the ground that it had become moot"

•

Vvhi.le

the case was pending in the Chancer,y Court, the state legislature
enacted the act of 191.j.l, no,v carried in the Code as sec. 2403.3,
and entitled, Educational facilities for negro citizens

liThe state board of education and the com
missioner of education are hereby authorized
and directed to provide educational training
and instruction for ne~ro citizens of Tennessee
equivalent to that provided at the University
of Tennessee by the 3tate of Tennessee for white
citizens of Tennessee. Such training and
instruction shall be made av~ilable in a manner
to be prescribed by the state board of education
and the commissioner of education; provided, that
members of the negro race and white race shall
not attend the same institution or place of
learning. The facilities of the Agricultural
and Industrial State College, and other institu
tions located in Tennessee, may b(~ used when
deemed advisable by the state board of education
and the commissioner of education, insofar as
the facilities of same are adequate. 1I
FolloWing enactment of the statute a supplemental answer was
filed in the case then pending, in which it was averred that
pursuant to the Act certain committees had been appointed by
the state board of. education, with instructions to report at
the board1s next regular meeting, an averment which suggested
that the act of 1941 Was to be made operative expeditiously_
The Supreme Court of Tennessee, in affirming the
Chancellor's dismissal of the consolidated case, construed
the act of 1941 to be mandatory in character.

"No discretion

w'hatever is vested in 'che State Board of Education under the
Act as to the performance of its mandates.
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The manner of

providing educational training and instruction for negro
citizens equivalent to that prov"ided for white citizens at the
University of Tennessee is for the Board of Education to
determine in its sound discretion, but the furnishing of such
equivalent instruction is mandatory.1i
et al v.

~jitham

State ex reI. Michael

et aI, 179 Tenn. 250.t 257.

The court also said at page

257~

nUpon the demand of

a negro upon the State Board of Education for training and
instruction in any branch of learning taught in the University
of Tennessee, it is the duty of the Board to provide such negro
with equal facilities of instruction in such subjects as that
enjoyed by the students of the University of Tennessee.

The

State Board of Education is entitled to reasonable advance
notice of the intention of a negro student to require such
facilities.

0

••

No such advance notice by appellants is

shown in the record."
At page 258, th9 court further said:

"It does not

appear that the State Board of Education is seeking in any way
to evade ·the perfonnance of Ghe duties placed upon it by
Chapter 43, Public Acts 1941, or that it is lacking sufficient
funds to carry out the purposes of the Act.

The state having

provided a full, adequate and complete method by w·hich negroes
may obtain educational training and instruction

equivalent to

that provided at the University of Tennessee, a decision of
the issues made in the consolidated causes becomes unnecessary
and improper.

The legislation of 1941 took no rights away

from appellants; on the contraFJ the right to equality in
education with white students WaS specifically recognized and
the method by which thos e rights Nould be satisfied was set
forth in the legislation.

\That more could be demanded?"

B.y failure to deny

I'

-0

:_1'

'.

the allegations of the complaint, defendants admit that the
directive,

thou~;h

mandatory, has not been carried outo

Nevertheless, it is urged by defendants that these plaintiffs
. have no standing here until they have petitioned the state
board of education to furnish the equivalent educational
training and instruction for negroes provided for by the act.
The Supreme Court of the state noted in its opinion that the
then applicants for admission to the University of Tennessee
had given to the state board uno such advance notice" of a desire
to be furnished facilities under the act.

That omission is

understandable here for the reason that their applications for
admission to the University of Tennessee had not been finally
disposed of by the courts, and the need of their applying to
the state board had not been established.
Since the enactrnen t of the Act of 1941 and the decision in
State ex rel. Michael et al v. 'dtham et al, 179 Tenn. 250, the
Supreme Court of the United 3tates has emphasized the pronounce
ment of one of its older cases as to a particular element of
equal protection.

In Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305

U.3. 337, it appeared that Lincoln University, ·a state-supDorted
As to

school for negroes, intended to establish a law school.
this intention the court said:

If • • •

it cannot be said that a

mere declaration of purpose, still unfulfilled, is enough. 1f
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 346.
same Case, at

r.a ge

351, the court said:

right was a personal one.

If

In the

Here , petitioner IS

It was as an individual that he WaS

entitled to the equal protection of the laWS, and the State
was bound to furnish him within its borders facilities for
legal education substantially equal to those which the State
there afforded for persons of the'v{hite race, ••• "

Later

declarations indicate that the two quotations should be read
together and that '.;.rhen so read they state the requirement of
equality of

op~ortunity

to be personal and immediate.

In Fisher v. Hurst, 333 u.S. 147, the court emphasized
its pOSition that equality of opportunity in education means
present equality, not the promise of future equality.

This

re-emphasized the necessity of equality as to time of an
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~.r~eCiSiOIl'

/~

"The State must

"here the court said:

provide it for her in conformity with the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and provide it as soon as
it does for applicants of any other group. If

Sipuel v. Board

of ltegents of the Univarsity of Oklahoma et aI, 332 U. 3. 631.
In the holding in McLaurin

637, 642, the court

said~

Va

u.s.

Oklahoma State Regents, 339

I!.Je conclude that the conditions under

which this appellant is required to receive his education
deprive him of his personal and present right to the equal
protection of the laws ~ I!

That equality of educational

opnortunity for negroes means present equality was emphasized
once more in d.'matt v. Paint.er at aI, 339

u.s. 629, 635:

"Thls

Court has stated unanimously that 'The State must provide
(legal education) for (petitioner) in conformity with the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and provide it
as soon as it does for applicants of any other group f
v. Board of Regents, 332

u.s. 631, 6330 fl

•

Sipuel

In view of these recent

declarations of the Supreme Court of the United 3tates, this Court
is forced to conclude that the defense of exhaustion of administra
tiv~

remedies fails.
The Court finds that under the Gaines, Sipuel,

~weatt

and

McLaurin cases heretofore cited, these plaintiffs are being denied
their
~:~

ri~t

Fourteenth Amendment and holds that under the decisions of the

~~~ suprem.e
.

to the equal protection of the laws as provided by the

&4.. ,~

Y

Court the plaintiffs are entitled to be

arn:~~~~~~:2~_

~?~OO,ls~:...~~:~~~n!'~,:E_,~.i.:~.,.~E,,::',~~,~~::;_, to which they have .~?p~~~d
for admission.

'Believing that the Universi ty authorities iiill

either comply with the lai'l as herein declared or take the case up
on appeal,

th~

Court does not deem an injunctive order presently

to be appropriate.

The case, hOYvever, will be retained on the

docket for such orders as may seem proper when it appears that
the applicable law has been finally declared.

ROBT. L. TAYltOR
United States ~istrict Judge
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